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I. INTRODUCTION

“Indian gaming is a national multi-billion dollar enterprise and
growing.”1 Even in 2008, amidst an economic downturn, the revenues
generated by the tribal gaming industry continued to show growth.2 In
2008 alone, Indian gaming generated $26.7 billion3 and accounted for a
little more than a quarter of the gaming industry revenues in the United
States.4 The explosion of tribal gaming “has been fueled by Americans’
seemingly insatiable appetites for slots, high-stakes poker, and bingo.”5
Indian gaming serves as the single source of income for a number of tribes
and is the lifeblood of many tribes’ finances.6 Tribes use their gaming
profits to “fund education, improve health and elder care, enhance police
and fire departments, build housing and roads, develop environmental

1. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Comparative Rights of Indispensable Sovereigns, 40 GONZ.
L. REV. 1, 73 (2004–2005) (footnote omitted); see Steven Andrew Light & Kathryn R.L. Rand, The
Hand That’s Been Dealt: The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act at 20, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 413, 414
(2009) (noting “[t]oday, tribal gaming is the fastest-growing segment of legalized gambling in the
United States.”).
2. Press Release, National Indian Gaming Commission, NIGC Announces 2008 Revenues
(June 3, 2009), available at http://www.nigc.gov/ReadingRoom/PressReleases/PressReleasesMain/
PR113062009/tabid/918/Default.aspx [hereinafter NIGC Press Release]. The Commission
Chairman noted the industry’s growth was less than it had been in recent years and pointed to the
economic downturn as the cause. Id. However, it is important to note that “industry growth is not
uniform across tribes, states, or gambling facilities.” Light & Rand, supra note 1, at 424. A tribe’s
location is a key factor in determining how much income a tribal casino will generate. Id.
3. NIGC Press Release, supra note 2. NIGC statistics are based on independent audit reports
of all tribal gaming operations received by the NIGC from the tribes. Id. Gaming revenues represent
amounts wagered by gaming patrons, less prizes paid. Id. Indian gaming revenues for 2008
increased by 2.3% over the prior year. Id. In the Washington Region, which includes tribal gaming
operations in Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, and New
York, there was a 5.9% increase in gaming revenue over the prior year, with gaming revenues
exceeding $6.7 billion. NIGC.gov, Tribal Gaming Revenues (in thousands) by Region: Fiscal Year
2008 and 2007, http://www.nigc.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=ovXzGP81fLY%3d&tabid=918
(last visited Oct. 12, 2009).
4. Light & Rand, supra note 1, at 416.
5. Light & Rand, supra note 1, at 414.
6. Fletcher, supra note 1, at 73. “Without question, gaming revenues have brought many
tribes back from a very desperate state of dependency and near-extinction.” Id. at 75 (footnote
omitted).
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programs, launch commercial ventures, and buy back reservation lands.”7
Namely, Indian gaming moves American Indians, “who have historically
been the poorest of the poor, from welfare to work by providing job
opportunities and diminishing the state’s responsibility to make public
entitlement payments.”8 Similarly, tribal casinos benefit non-tribal
jurisdictions and contribute to local economic development by creating
hundreds of thousands of jobs for non-Indians and generating billions of
dollars in economic development for the surrounding communities.9
On November 14, 2007, Florida Governor Charles Crist, on behalf of
the State of Florida, attempted to capitalize on this multi-billion dollar
enterprise when he signed a twenty-five-year gambling compact
(Compact)10 with the Seminole Tribe of Florida (Tribe).11 In signing the
Compact, Crist ended sixteen years of negotiations and significantly
expanded casino gambling in Florida.12 Among other things, the Compact
gave the Tribe the exclusive right to conduct several types of Class III
gaming,13 including slot machines, any banking or “banked” card games,
and high stakes poker games, all of which are illegal under Florida law.14 In
exchange for the “partial but substantial exclusivity” to operate the games,
the Tribe committed to pay the State of Florida a share of its gaming
revenue, amounting to more than $100 million a year.15
7. Sandra Ashton, The Role of the National Indian Gaming Commission in the Regulation of
Tribal Gaming, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 545, 545 (2003); see Light & Rand, supra note 1, at 426.
8. Light & Rand, supra note 1, at 426 (footnote omitted); see Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven
Andrew Light, How Congress Can and Should “Fix” the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act:
Recommendations for Law and Policy Reform, 13 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 396, 416–17 (2006)
(noting the economic and social benefits that states with Indian gaming operations and nonreservation communities located near tribal casinos have received from gaming operations).
9. See Ashton, supra note 7, at 545–46; Light & Rand, supra note 1, at 416; see also
National Indian Gaming Association, Indian Gaming Facts, http://www.indiangaming.org/library/
indian-gaming-facts/index.shtml (last visited Oct. 12, 2009) [hereinafter Indian Gaming Facts]
(noting Indian Gaming created more than 670,000 jobs with 75% of those employees being nonIndian). Not all commentators view Indian gaming with such enthusiasm. See Bernard P. Horn, Is
There a Cure for America’s Gambling Addiction?, USA TODAY MAGAZINE, May 1997, at 34, 35,
available at 1997 WLNR 6897618 (noting “a considerable body of evidence showed that the
expansion of legalized gambling destroys individuals, wrecks families, increases crime, and
ultimately costs society far more than the government makes”).
10. Fla. House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 603 (Fla. 2008); Robert M. Jarvis,
The 2007 Seminole-Florida Gambling Compact, 12 GAMING L. REV. 13, 13 (2008). For a copy of
the Compact, see Crist, 999 So. 2d at 622–43. A copy of the Compact is reprinted in Crist.
11. The Seminole Tribe “is a federally recognized tribal government possessing sovereign
powers and rights of self-government.” Crist, 999 So. 2d at 623 (discussing Part II.A).
12. Crist, 999 So. 2d at 603; Jarvis, supra note 10, at 13.
13. See infra Part II (discussing Class III gaming).
14. Crist, 999 So. 2d at 603, 606.
15. Id. at 606. The Tribe would pay the state $50 million once the Compact becomes
effective, $175 million over the first twenty-four months of operation and $150 million for the third
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Less than a year after the execution of the Compact, however, the
Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives sued the governor in the
Florida Supreme Court, alleging that he had overstepped his bounds.16 The
Florida Supreme Court held the governor did not possess the authority to
bind the State to a gaming compact that clearly departed “from the State’s
public policy by legalizing types of gaming that are illegal everywhere else
in the state.”17 Notably, the ruling did not invalidate the Compact.18
While the validity of the Compact remained uncertain, the Tribe
continued to operate the illegal games in several of its casinos throughout
Florida,19 claiming it is not required to abide by the ruling because “Florida
enjoys no compulsory authority over activities on [Indian] lands.”20 The
Tribe further asserted it has the authority to operate the games under the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).21
To address this issue, the Florida Legislature proposed legislation22 that
laid out the framework for a new compact (Proposed Compact).23 Notably,

twelve months of operation. Id. For each twelve-month cycle after that, the Tribe would pay the
State a minimum of $100 million. Id.; see Crist, 999 So. 2d at 634, 641–43. “Indian Gaming
Report, which monitors Tribal casinos, estimates the Seminoles had more than $1 billion in gaming
revenue in 2006.” Jim Freer, FL Tracks Wary as Tribal Gaming Expands, BLOOD-HORSE
MAGAZINE, June 13, 2008, available at http://www.bloodhorse.com/horse-racing/articles/45713/fltracks-wary-as-tribal-gaming-expands (last visited Oct. 12, 2009).
16. See Robert M. Jarvis, 2007–2008 Survey of Florida Gambling Law, 33 NOVA L. REV.
231, 243 (2008).
17. Crist, 999 So. 2d at 603.
18. Mary Wozniak, If Gaming Deal Fails, Seminole Tribe to Take It to Feds, FORT MYERS
NEWS-PRESS, June 16, 2009, at A1.
19. Letter from Bill McCollum, Attorney General of Florida, to Philip N. Hogen, Chairman,
National Indian Gaming Commission (Sept. 19, 2008), available at http://media.tbo.com/pdf/0919
08hogenletter.pdf. [hereinafter Letter from McCollum] (noting “[d]espite the Florida Supreme
Court’s ruling, the Tribe continues to offer banked card games and [C]lass III slot machines.”); see
Mary Ellen Klas, Ruling Won’t Halt Seminoles’ Card Games, MIAMI HERALD, July 20, 2008, at A1,
available at 2008 WLNR 13529589.
20. See Response of Governor Crist in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto at
3, Fla. House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 2008) (No. SC07-2154) [hereinafter
Crist Response]; see, e.g., Teta v. Brooks, 614 N.W.2d 242, 244 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (holding
state courts, absent a grant of federal authority, have no jurisdiction over Indians, Indian tribes or
other Indian entities).
21. Jon Burstein, Does Ruling Put Hard Rock in a Hard Place? Table Games May Be
Eliminated, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, July 5, 2008, at A1, available at 2008 WLNR 12625224 (noting
“[t]ribal attorneys say the casino has the authority to operate the games under federal
law . . . because the U.S. Department of the Interior approved the [Compact][.]”); see Wozniak,
supra note 18 (noting the Compact has federal approval and according to a tribal attorney “remains
in effect until appropriate federal agencies or courts say it is no longer effective.”).
22. An Act Relating to Indian Gaming, S. 788 (Fla. 2009), available at
http://www.flsenate.gov/data/session/2009/Senate/bills/billtext/pdf/s0788er.pdf.
[hereinafter
Gaming Act].
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the Proposed Compact increased the annual payments the Tribe must make
to the State, yet it decreased the number of casinos at which the Tribe is
permitted to operate Class III games.24 Nearly two months following its
passage, the Tribe and the governor signed the Proposed Compact.25 Not
surprisingly, however, the Tribe rejected several key provisions the
Legislature originally set forth in the Proposed Compact.26 As a result,
many Florida lawmakers are reluctant to ratify the revisions in the
Proposed Compact, leaving the future of Indian gaming in Florida highly
uncertain.27
This Note examines the controversy and key issues surrounding the
nearly two-decade-long clash between the Tribe and the State of Florida
over the operation of Class III games on tribal lands in Florida. Using
Florida as a backdrop, this Note illuminates three significant issues
currently at the center of Indian gaming law: (1) whether a compact may
permit Class III games that a state’s laws explicitly prohibit; (2) whether a
tribe’s political leverage in compact negotiations is weakened in light of
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida (Seminole Tribe)28 and Texas v.
United States;29 and (3) whether the Secretary of the Department of the
Interior (Secretary) has the unilateral authority to promulgate rules in the
absence of a compact. By analyzing these issues in the context of Florida’s
Compact and the Proposed Compact, while drawing on similar situations
in other states, this Note provides guidance to other states hosting Indian
gaming facilities within their borders.30
Part II of this Note discusses IGRA and explains the Indian gaming
compact procedure, highlighting federal and Florida gaming laws. Part II
further unveils the history of Florida’s Compact negotiations and explores
the issues and controversy surrounding the Compact. Part III of this Note
analyzes the Compact’s validity under IGRA, concluding the Compact is
invalid because it authorizes games that are expressly prohibited by Florida
criminal law (thereby failing to meet one of IGRA’s requirements). Part III
23. See Mary Ellen Klas, Gov. Charlie Crist Resumes Gambling Talks with Seminoles, MIAMI
HERALD, July 1, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 12560041.
24. Catherine Dolinski, Gaming Deal May Need Alteration, TAMPA TRIB., June 13, 2009, at 4,
available at 2009 WLNR 11646530. For a comparison of the terms of the Compact with the terms
of the Proposed Compact, see infra Part IV.B.
25. Press Release, Charlie Crist, Governor of Florida, Governor Crist, Seminole Tribe of
Florida Sign Estimated $6.8 Billion Compact (Aug. 31, 2009), available at
http://www.flgov.com/release/11004 [hereinafter Crist Press Release].
26. Catherine Dolinski, Gaming Deals Approval Not Set in Stone, TAMPA TRIB., Sept. 6,
2009, at 13, available at 2009 WLNR 18247797.
27. Id.
28. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
29. 497 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2007).
30. There are twenty-eight states that host tribal gaming facilities within their borders. Indian
Gaming Facts, supra note 9.
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further suggests the Seminole Tribe is currently operating illegal Class III
games. Part IV of this Note explores the complex enforcement issues
surrounding the Compact and outlines the Proposed Compact as well as
the Tribe’s response to the Proposed Compact. Part IV further highlights
the issues the State and the Tribe should consider in evaluating which
revised provisions of the Proposed Compact to accept. Finally, Part IV
challenges the parties to work together in creating a compact that is
mutually beneficial.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Opening Line: The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and the
Compact Procedure
Prior to the enactment of IGRA in 1988, states did not play a role in
Indian gaming regulation.31 IGRA was enacted to establish a federal
regulatory authority over gaming on tribal lands.32 More generally,
Congress intended IGRA “to provide a statutory basis for the operation of
gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic
development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments[.]”33 Among
other things, IGRA “defines classes of Indian gaming, establishes the
National Indian Gaming Commission to monitor and regulate some forms
of Indian gaming, and provides a tribal-state ‘compacting’ procedure
through which states may participate in the regulation of Indian gaming.”34
IGRA divides Indian gaming into three classes of escalating stakes, the
most important of which is Class III.35 Class III gaming is the catch-all
category comprised of “all forms of gaming that are not [C]lass I gaming or

31. Complaint at 2, Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. United States, 2007 WL 5077484 (S.D. Fla.
2007) (No. 07-60317).
32. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C § 2702(3) (2006).
33. Id. § 2702(1); see Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity “Exception,” 110
HARV. L. REV. 102, 108 n.49 (1996) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2702(2) (2006) (noting IGRA also aimed
to ensure gaming was “conducted fairly and honestly” on Indian lands by shielding Indian gaming
from corruptive influences and ensuring “the Indian tribe is the primary beneficiary of the gaming
operation”)).
34. Monaghan, supra note 33, at 108–09 (citing 25 U.S.C. §§ 2703–2710 (2006)).
35. Monaghan, supra note 33, at 109 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2703(8) (2006)). Class I games are
traditional tribal or social games played for prizes of minimal value and are exclusively regulated by
the tribes. Id. at n.53 (citing 25 U.S.C. §§ 2703(6), 2710(a)(1) (2006)). Class II games are games of
chance which are played for prizes and include bingo, pull-tabs, and other similar games. Id. (citing
25 U.S.C. § 2703(7) (2006)). Class II games are also regulated by the tribes, but each tribe
conducting Class II gaming is required to have a tribal gaming ordinance approved by the National
Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC). 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1)(B) (2006). For a detailed explanation
of the three classes of games under IGRA, see Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 494 (5th Cir.
2007).
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[C]lass II gaming,”36 and includes any casino-style or “banking” game,37
such as blackjack, roulette, and craps; slot machines; and lotteries.38
Importantly, Class III gaming activities are lawful on Indian lands only if
those activities are: (1) authorized by a tribal ordinance; (2) “located in a
State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person,
organization, or entity,” and (3) “conducted in accordance with a TribalState compact entered into by the Indian tribe and the State . . . that is in
effect.”39
IGRA prescribes a negotiating process for Class III gaming activities
between the Indian tribes and their host states.40 “Upon a tribe’s request, a
state ‘shall negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith to enter into such a
compact.’”41 If the parties negotiate a compact successfully and the
Secretary approves it, notice of the approval is published in the Federal
Register and the compact takes effect.42 If the state fails to negotiate in
good faith and the state and the tribe do not achieve a mutually satisfactory
compact, IGRA allows a tribe to sue the state in federal court.43
Importantly, however, states are not forced to consent to such lawsuits
because the U.S. Supreme Court held in Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida44 that IGRA does not abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment
immunity to these suits.45

36. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(8) (2006).
37. “‘Banking game’ means a game in which the house is a participant in the game, taking on
players, paying winners, and collecting from losers or in which the cardroom establishes a bank
against which participants play.” FLA. STAT. § 849.086(b) (2009). See infra Part II.B. for a
discussion of “banked” games in Florida.
38. Ezekiel J.N. Fletcher, Negotiating Meaningful Concessions from States in Gaming
Compacts to Further Tribal Economic Development: Satisfying the “Economic Benefits” Test, 54
S.D. L. REV. 419, 428 (2009).
39. Fla. House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 604 (Fla. 2008) (emphasis altered)
(citing 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1) (2006)).
40. Id.
41. Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (2006)).
42. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(B) (2006)).
43. Katie Eidson, Note, Will States Continue to Provide Exclusivity in Tribal Gaming
Compacts or Will Tribes Bust on the Hand of the State in Order to Expand Indian Gaming, 29 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 319, 324 (2004–2005); see Monaghan, supra note 33, at 109. “If the court finds the
state negotiated in good faith, the tribe’s proposal fails.” Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 494
(5th Cir. 2007). If the court finds the state lacked good faith, however, the court may order
negotiation, then mediation. Id. “If the state ultimately rejects a court-appointed mediator’s
proposal, the Secretary ‘shall prescribe, in consultation with the Indian tribe, procedures . . . under
which [C]lass III gaming may be conducted.’” Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B) (2006)).
44. 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996).
45. Crist, 999 So. 2d at 604 (citing Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47). For a discussion of
Seminole Tribe’s effect on a tribe’s bargaining power in tribal-state compacting negotiations, see
infra Part IV.C.2.
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To work around the Court’s decision in Seminole Tribe and to provide a
remedy to tribes, the Secretary promulgated regulations (Secretarial
Procedures) that allowed the Secretary to issue administrative rules
governing Class III gaming.46 In the event a state asserts its sovereign
immunity and refuses to consent to a tribe’s suit, a tribe may petition the
Secretary for a framework to regulate Class III gaming activities.47 The
Secretary has sixty days “to examine a tribe’s proposal [to determine] if it
meets the statutory criteria including whether the proposal is consistent”
with IGRA and whether the state “permits such gaming.”48 During that
same period, the state’s governor and attorney general are invited to review
the proposal and offer an alternative proposal.49 If the state does not submit
an alternative proposal, the Secretary will review the tribe’s proposal and
either approve or disapprove it.50 On the other hand, if the state submits an
alternative proposal, the Secretary appoints a mediator who will select a
proposal using the procedures IGRA prescribes.51 Ultimately, the Secretary
has the final administrative authority to approve or disapprove the
proposals.52

46. Texas, 497 F.3d at 494; Light & Rand, supra note 1, at 432 (citation omitted).
47. Crist, 999 So. 2d at 604–05 (citation omitted). For a detailed overview of the Secretarial
Procedures see Michael E. Wheeler, One White Buffalo, Why not Three?: Native American Gaming
in the Lone Star State, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 147, 152–53 (2006–2007). At least one circuit court has
held that the Secretary lacked the authority to issue the Secretarial Procedures. Crist, 999 So. 2d at
605 (citing Texas, 497 F.3d at 493). For a detailed analysis of Texas v. United States and its impact
on tribal-state compacting see infra Part IV.
48. Complaint at 6, Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. United States, 2007 WL 5077484 (S.D. Fla.
2007) (No. 07-60317); see also Texas, 497 F.3d at 494.
49. Texas, 497 F.3d at 494–95; see Wheeler, supra note 47, at 153.
50. “If the state does not submit an alternative proposal, the Secretary reviews the tribe’s
proposal and either approves it or offers the opportunity for a conference between the state and the
tribe to address ‘unresolved issues and areas of disagreements in the proposal.’” Texas, 497 F.3d at
494 (quoting 25 C.F.R. § 291.8(b)(2) (2008)). The Secretary then must make a “‘final decision
either setting forth the Secretary’s proposed Class III gaming procedures for the Indian tribe, or
disapproving the proposal.’” Id. at 494–95 (quoting 25 C.F.R. § 291.8).
51. Id. at 495 (citing 25 C.F.R. §§ 291.9–291.10 (2008)); Wheeler, supra note 47, at 153.
52. Wheeler, supra note 47, at 153 (citing 25 C.F.R. § 291.8(c) (2008)). The State can object
to the mediator’s proposal, in which case the Secretary will make the ultimate decision. Texas, 497
F.3d at 495. In the event the Secretary rejects the mediator’s proposal, the Secretary is to prescribe
procedures that comport with the mediator’s selected version as much as possible, as well as with
IGRA and state law. Alabama v. United States, No. 08-0182-WS-C, 2008 WL 5071904, at *2 (S.D.
Ala. Nov. 24, 2008).
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B. Betting Limits: Federal Gaming Law and Florida’s Gaming
Laws
Pursuant to federal law, state gaming laws apply on tribal lands absent a
tribal-state compact.53 Therefore, “what is legal in Florida is legal on tribal
lands, and what is illegal in Florida is illegal there. Absent a compact, any
gambling prohibited in the state is prohibited on tribal land.”54
Florida permits limited forms of Class III gaming.55 For example,
Florida’s Constitution authorizes the state lottery56 and slot machines in
Broward and Miami-Dade counties.57 Florida also permits and regulates
pari-mutuel wagering on jai alai and dog and horse racing.58 Moreover, the
State expressly authorizes cardroom gaming, including, among other
games, poker, rummy, hearts, bridge, and dominos in which “the winnings
of any player in a single round, hand, or game do not exceed $10 in
value.”59 Furthermore, the State “permits and profits from a vast gaming
cruise industry through ‘cruises to nowhere,’ which operate out of many
Florida ports.”60 These cruises offer “the full range of casino games”
including slot machines and table games.61
Notwithstanding the preceding, Florida “prohibits all other types of
Class III gaming.”62 Florida law distinguishes “nonbanked” games from
“banked” games.63 A “banked” game is a type of Class III gaming “‘in
53. Fla. House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 614 (Fla. 2008) (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 1166(a) (2006)).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. (citing FLA. CONST. art. X, §§ 7, 15). The State Lottery Department operates “an
almost unlimited range of gaming activities, including card and casino games.” Intergovernmental
Gaming Agreement Act: Hearing on S. 985 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. 53
(1999) (statement of James E. Billie, Chairman, Seminole Tribe of Florida) [hereinafter Statement
of Billie]. For instance, the State Lottery Department has previously conducted games which
“mimic traditional card and casino gaming” including “a house-banked hi-low card game, a wheel
game similar to roulette, and a dice game similar to craps.” Id. The State Lottery Department also
operates devices, such as “Instant Ticket Vending Machines,” which fall within the State’s
definition of “slot machine.” Id.
57. Crist, 999 So. 2d at 614 (citing FLA. CONST. art. X, §§ 7, 15).
58. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 550.001–.913 (2007)); see Statement of Billie, supra note 56, at
54 (noting Florida’s allowance and regulation of “a broad range of pari-mutuel and simulcast
activity[]”). “‘Pari-mutuel’ means a system of betting on races or games in which the winners divide
the total amount bet, after deducting management expenses and taxes, in proportion to the sums
they have wagered individually and with regard to the odds assigned to particular outcomes.” FLA.
STAT. § 550.002(22).
59. See FLA. STAT. § 849.085 (2007); Statement of Billie, supra note 56, at 53 (discussing the
five types of gaming that Florida law permits the Seminole Tribe to operate).
60. Statement of Billie, supra note 56, at 54.
61. Statement of Billie, supra note 56, at 54.
62. Crist, 999 So. 2d at 614; see FLA. STAT. §§ 849.01–849.46.
63. Crist, 999 So. 2d at 614 (footnote omitted).
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which the house is a participant in the game, taking on players, paying
winners, and collecting from losers or in which the cardroom establishes a
bank against which participants play.’”64 In contrast, a “nonbanked” game
is a form of Class II gaming in which participants play against each other
rather than against the house.65 While Florida law permits “nonbanked”
games, it expressly prohibits “banked” card games.66 Therefore, absent a
valid tribal-state compact that permits “banked games,” such games are
illegal on tribal lands in Florida.
C. Not a Sure Bet: Sixteen Years of Compact Negotiations
The Tribe first sought to negotiate a Class III gaming compact in
January of 1991.67 In September of that year, the Tribe requested the State
to enter into good faith compact negotiations pursuant to IGRA.68 The
negotiations were unsuccessful and later that year, the Tribe filed suit
against the State alleging the State failed to negotiate a compact in good
faith.69 The State asserted Eleventh Amendment immunity, and the suit
was dismissed.70
Over the next several years, the Tribe continually submitted proposals
to the Secretary to establish Class III gaming procedures.71 Finally, in
1999, one of the Tribe’s proposals was deemed to meet the regulations of
the Department of the Interior (Department).72 Shortly thereafter, the
Secretary held an informal conference between the Secretary, the Tribe,
and the State.73 At the State’s suggestion, however, the conference was
temporarily suspended.74
In 2001, more than a year after the informal conference, the Secretary
finally issued a decision on the scope of gaming permitted in Florida.75 In
that decision, the Secretary allowed the tribe to offer a wide range of
64. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 849.086(2)(b)). Examples of “banked” card games include
blackjack, baccarat, and chemin de fer. Id.
65. Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto at 5, Crist, 999 So. 2d 601 (No. SC07-2154).
66. Crist, 999 So. 2d at 614 (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 849.086(12)(a), (15)(a)).
67. Id. at 605. The negotiations between the Seminole Tribe and the State have spanned
sixteen years and four different governors. Id.
68. Complaint at 4, Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. United States, 2007 WL 5077484 (S.D. Fla.
2007) (No. 07-60317).
69. Crist, 999 So. 2d at 605.
70. Id. (citing Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996)).
71. Id. at 605.
72. Complaint at 6, Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. United States, 2007 WL 5077484 (S.D. Fla.
2007) (No. 07-60317).
73. Id. at 7.
74. Crist, 999 So. 2d at 605.
75. Complaint at 7, Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. United States, 2007 WL 5077484 (S.D. Fla.
2007) (No. 07-60317).
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Class III games.76 Approximately five months later, however, without any
notice to the Tribe, the Secretary withdrew the decision “in order to
evaluate the important issues raised in this matter.”77 The delay continued
for more than five years.78 Finally, in 2006, the Secretary reconvened the
conference and warned that if the Tribe and the State did not reach an
agreement within sixty days, the Department would issue Class III gaming
procedures.79
Six months later, with no progress made, the Tribe sued the Department
in federal court.80 The Department then warned the governor to negotiate a
compact with the Tribe by November 15, 2007, or the Department would
issue procedures.81 On November 14, 2007, one day before the deadline,
Governor Crist entered into the Compact with the Tribe.82
D. Upping the Ante: Florida Claims the Compact is Invalid
Five days after Governor Crist entered into the Compact with the Tribe,
the House of Representatives and its Speaker83 filed a petition to the
Florida Supreme Court “disputing the Governor’s authority to bind the
State to the Compact without legislative authorization or ratification.”84
The Florida Supreme Court held that Governor Crist lacked the authority
to bind the State to the Compact because it contradicted state law.85 The
court reasoned the governor did not have the constitutional authority to
bind the State to a gaming compact that “clearly departs from the State’s
public policy by legalizing types of gaming that are illegal everywhere else
in the state.”86 Notably, however, the court did not resolve whether the
Compact violated IGRA.87 The court only decided the narrower issue of
76. Id.
77. Id. at 8.
78. Crist, 999 So. 2d at 605.
79. Id.
80. Id. (citing Complaint, Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. United States, 2007 WL 5077484 (S.D.
Fla. 2007) (No. 07-60317)).
81. Id. “Under the proposed procedures, the State would not receive any revenue and would
have no control over the Tribe’s gaming operations.” Id. The Tribe would have been able to operate
Class III games such as slot machines and card games. Id. The procedures, however, “would not
have permitted the Tribe to operate banked card games . . . .” Id. (footnote omitted).
82. Id. at 606.
83. When the petition was filed, the Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives was
Republican Marco Rubio. Florida House of Representatives, Marco Rubio
http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Representatives/details.aspx?MemberId=4180&Session
Id=54 (last visited Oct. 12, 2009).
84. Crist, 999 So. 2d at 606.
85. Id. at 612, 616.
86. Id. at 603. “The Governor does not have authority to agree to legalize in some parts of the
state, or for some persons, conduct that is otherwise illegal throughout the state.” Id. at 613.
87. Id. at 615.
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whether the Florida Constitution granted the governor the authority to bind
Florida to a compact that violated the State’s public policy.88
III. FOLD OR HOLD? AN ANALYSIS OF THE COMPACT’S VALIDITY
UNDER IGRA
As noted above, according to IGRA, Class III gaming activities are
lawful on Indian lands if those activities are: (1) authorized by a tribal
ordinance; (2) “located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose
by any person, organization, or entity;” and (3) “conducted in accordance
with a Tribal-State compact entered into by the Indian tribe and the
State . . . that is in effect.”89 Pursuant to IGRA, the terms of a compact
cannot, under any circumstances, contradict a state’s expressed laws.90
Accordingly, to determine whether this Compact violates IGRA, one must
resolve whether the gaming activities authorized by the Compact contradict
Florida’s laws, or as IGRA states, whether Florida “permits such gaming
for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity.”91
Attempts to interpret the “permits such gaming” provision have
garnered a great deal of litigation92—so much so, that a circuit split exists
regarding the proper interpretation of the phrase.93 Notably, in rendering its
decision, the Florida Supreme Court failed to interpret IGRA’s “permits
such gaming” provision under Florida law.94 Notwithstanding, this Note
concludes that Florida does not “permit[] such [Class III] gaming,” and
therefore, the Compact provisions authorizing Class III games contradict
Florida law. As a result, the Compact fails to meet one of IGRA’s
requirements and is therefore invalid under IGRA.95
A. A Roll of the Dice: The Circuit Split on the Interpretation of
“Permits Such Gaming”
As stated above, a circuit split exists regarding the interpretation of the
phrase “permits such gaming.”96 The interpretation of the phrase hinges on
whether courts decide state law prohibits Class III gaming or whether state
88. Id.
89. Id. at 604 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1) (2006)); see supra Part
II.A.
90. Crist, 999 So. 2d at 612.
91. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B).
92. Crist, 999 So. 2d at 615.
93. See infra Part III.A.
94. Crist, 999 So. 2d at 615.
95. See Letter from McCollum, supra note 19 (noting “the Compact is invalid, . . . [and]
[C]lass III gaming on Indian lands [is] illegal”).
96. Melissa S. Taylor, Comment, Categorical vs. Game-Specific: Adopting the Categorical
Approach to Interpreting “Permits Such Gaming,” 43 TULSA L. REV. 89, 90 (2007).
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law merely regulates Class III gaming.97 The U.S. Supreme Court
established this regulatory-prohibitory distinction in California v. Cabazon
Band of Mission Indians.98 According to the Court, “if the intent of a state
law is generally to prohibit certain conduct,” it falls within the state’s grant
of criminal jurisdiction over Indian lands; “but if the state law generally
permits the conduct at issue, subject to regulation,” it does not fall within
the state’s authority over regulation on Indian lands.99 The Court noted that
in order to enforce state laws on tribal lands, a court must determine
“whether the law is criminal in nature, and thus fully applicable to” tribal
land, or civil in nature, and therefore not applicable to tribal land.100 The
Court cautioned that the mere fact “an otherwise regulatory law is
enforceable by criminal as well as civil means does not necessarily convert
it into a criminal law.”101
The Senate Report accompanying IGRA also provided insight regarding
the meaning of the phrase “permits such gaming.”102 The Report noted that
courts should distinguish between state criminal laws that prohibit gaming
activities and state civil laws that regulate gaming activities to determine
whether a state “permits such gaming.”103
Circuit courts have taken two distinct approaches to interpreting this
controversial phrase.104 The Second Circuit adopts the “categorical”
approach105 while the Eighth and Ninth Circuits adopt the “game-specific”
approach.106 Under the “categorical” approach, a tribe can offer Class III
games if the state permits any Class III game to be conducted in the
97. See PPI, Inc. v. Kempthorne, No. 4:08CV248(SPM), 2008 WL 2705431, at *2 n.2 (N.D.
Fla. July 8, 2008).
98. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
99. Id. at 209.
100. Id. at 208.
101. Id. at 211.
102. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, No. 91-6756, 1993 WL475999, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Sept.
22, 1993) (quoting S. REP. No. 100-446, at 7 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3076).
103. Id. While the Senate Report referred to the phrase in the context of Class II gaming
activities, the identical phrase is repeated regarding Class III activities. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C.
§ 2710(d)(1)(B) (2006)). Generally, when a “phrase is used in more than one section of an act, and
the meaning is clear as used in one place, ‘it will be construed to have the same meaning in the next
place.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Nunez, 573 F.2d 769, 771 (2d Cir. 1978)). Therefore, the
“legislative history relating to the phrase as found in the provision governing Class II gaming is
instructive regarding the meaning of the language found in the provision governing Class III
gaming.” Id.
104. See Taylor, supra note 96, at 99.
105. Id. (citing Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024, 1031–32 (2d Cir.
1990)).
106. Id. (citing Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273, 278–79 (8th Cir.
1993), Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians v. Wilson, 64 F.3d 1250, 1257–58 (9th Cir.
1994)).
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state.107 The theory behind the “categorical” approach is that the state is
“regulating” rather than prohibiting Class III gaming.108 For example,
“[u]nder this interpretation, if a tribe wants to offer roulette, a [C]lass III
game, it must only ensure the state offers some other game considered a
[C]lass III game such as poker or pari-mutuel wagering on horse racing.”109
In Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut,110 the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals took the “categorical” approach and ruled the state must
negotiate with the Tribe concerning Class III gaming activities.111
Connecticut law allowed various Class III games, including blackjack,
poker, roulette and baccarat;112 however, these activities were limited to
fund-raising purposes.113 The court concluded the Class III gaming at issue
did not violate the state’s public policy because Connecticut allowed Class
III games, even though they were highly regulated.114 Therefore, “such
gaming is not totally repugnant to the State’s public policy[,]” and
Connecticut regulates rather than prohibits Class III gaming.115
Wisconsin also adopted the “categorical” approach. In Lac du
Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin,116 the
tribes wanted to include Class III gaming, including blackjack, poker,
craps, and roulette in a compact.117 Wisconsin law only permitted lotteries
and pari-mutuel wagering.118 The court reasoned that because Wisconsin
permits some Class III gaming, the state is regulating the activity rather
than prohibiting it.119 The court determined that the state “permits such
gaming” under IGRA because Wisconsin “does not, as a matter of criminal
law and public policy, prohibit such gaming activity.”120 The court further
reasoned “if the state allows some forms of gambling, even subject to
extensive regulation, its policy is deemed to be . . . regulatory and it is
barred from” state regulation.121

107. PPI, Inc. v. Kempthorne, No. 4:08CV248(SPM), 2008 WL 2705431, at *2 n.2 (N.D. Fla.
July 8, 2008) (citing N. Arapaho Tribe v. Wyoming, 389 F.3d 1308, 1311 (10th Cir. 2004)); see
Taylor, supra note 96, at 90.
108. PPI, 2008 WL 2705431, at *2 n.2 (citing N. Arapaho, 389 F.3d at 1311).
109. Taylor, supra note 96, at 90 (footnote omitted).
110. 913 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1990).
111. Id. at 1031–32.
112. Id. at 1026 n.5.
113. Id. at 1029.
114. Id. at 1031.
115. Id. at 1031–32.
116. 770 F. Supp. 480 (W.D. Wis. 1991).
117. Id. at 483.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 486–87.
120. Id. at 486 (emphasis in original).
121. Id. at 485.
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On the other hand, under the “game-specific” approach, taken by the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits, a tribe can only offer a certain Class III game “if
the state expressly allows that game ‘for any purpose.’”122 Under this
approach, courts must determine whether state law permits the specific
game at issue.123 The theory underlining the “game-specific” approach is
that games not expressly permitted are prohibited by the state.124 Also
under this approach, if the state entirely prohibits a particular game, the
state does not “permit such gaming” even if the state permits other games
in the same category.125 “[T]he state’s permissive treatment as to one type
of Class III game does not mean that the state must negotiate with tribes as
to all Class III games.”126 To illustrate, if a tribe wishes to offer blackjack,
a Class III game, it must explicitly allow some organization to offer
blackjack for any purpose.127
In Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians v. Wilson,128 several
tribes sued the Governor of California because the state refused to
negotiate over the inclusion of Class III gaming, including “banked” card
games.129 California law allowed for some Class III gaming including
video lottery terminals and pari-mutuel horse racing,130 however,
California law expressly prohibited the operation of “banked” card games
as well as slot machines.131 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned
California law did not permit “banked” games despite the fact that
California law permitted games that “share[d] some characteristics with
banked” card games.132 The court noted, “IGRA does not require a state to
negotiate over one form of Class III gaming activity simply because it has
legalized another, albeit similar form of gaming.”133 A state is only
required to permit tribes to operate games that others are permitted to
operate, not “give tribes what others cannot have.”134
Similar to Rumsey, in Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota,135 a
tribe sued the state for failure to negotiate with the tribe over the inclusion
122. Taylor, supra note 96, at 90 (quoting N. Arapaho Tribe v. Wyoming, 389 F.3d 1308,
1311 (10th Cir. 2004).
123. N. Arapaho, 389 F.3d at 1311.
124. PPI, Inc. v. Kempthorne, No. 4:08CV248(SPM), 2008 WL 2705431, at *2 n.2 (N.D. Fla.
July 8, 2008) (citing N. Arapaho, 389 F.3d at 1311).
125. N. Arapaho, 389 F.3d at 1311.
126. Id.
127. See Taylor, supra note 96, at 90 (footnote omitted).
128. 64 F.3d 1250 (9th Cir. 1994).
129. Id. at 1255.
130. Id. at 1256.
131. Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE ANN §§ 330–330(b) (West 2009)).
132. Id. at 1258.
133. Id.
134. Id. (footnote omitted).
135. 3 F.3d 273 (8th Cir. 1993).
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of Class III gaming, specifically traditional keno.136 South Dakota law
allowed for certain types of Class III gaming including lotteries, limited
card games, slot machines, pari-mutuel horse and dog racing, and video
keno.137 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s
reasoning that video keno and traditional keno are not the same game and
South Dakota law did not permit traditional keno.138 The court reasoned
IGRA does not require the state to negotiate with respect to forms of
gaming it does not permit.139 “Because video keno and traditional keno are
not the same and video keno is the only form of keno allowed under state
law, it would be illegal . . . for the tribe to offer traditional keno . . . .”140
Ultimately, the court held the state did not have to negotiate with the tribe
regarding the tribe’s operation of traditional keno.141
A Florida federal district court has also addressed the interpretation of
the phrase “permits such gaming” under Florida law.142 In Seminole Tribe
of Florida v. Florida,143 the Tribe sued the State for failing to negotiate in
good faith regarding certain forms of Class III gaming.144 In its ruling, the
court took the “game-specific” approach, holding “IGRA does not require
all Class III gaming activities to be included in compact negotiations
merely because the State permits specific Class III gaming activities in
some form.”145 The court reasoned the State’s permission of specific Class
III gaming activities does not subject all Class III gaming activities to
negotiation.146 Although one Florida federal court has taken the “gamespecific” approach to the phrase “permits such gaming,” the Florida
Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals have not ruled
on the interpretation of this language.147 The U.S. Supreme Court has
stated, however, that “[t]he shorthand test is whether the conduct at issue
violates the State’s public policy.”148

136. Id. at 275, 278.
137. Id. at 276.
138. Id. at 277, 281.
139. Id. at 279.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, at *5–6 (S.D. Fla.
Sept. 22, 1993).
143. Id. at *1.
144. Id.
145. Id. at *17.
146. Id. at *6.
147. Crist Response, supra note 20.
148. Cal. v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 209 (1987).
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B. Flush or Flop? Does Florida “Permit Such Gaming”?
In response to the court’s ruling in Florida House of Representatives v.
Crist, the Tribe filed a motion for rehearing encouraging the court to take a
“categorical” approach to the “permits such gaming” language under
IGRA.149 The Tribe argued that the State, through certain exceptions in
Florida law, “is authorized to conduct extensive forms of gambling—
including banked card games,” and therefore, Florida “permits such
gaming” under IGRA.150 The Tribe alleged that because Florida allows
“banked” card games through the state lottery and Class III slot machines
in Broward County, the State is regulating the games rather than
prohibiting them.151 Accordingly, once Florida permitted banked card
games, the State “was foreclosed from imposing a policy that prohibited
banked card games or Class III slots on any tribal lands in the state.”152
IGRA plainly states, however, that Class III gaming is not permitted in
jurisdictions where specific Class III gaming activities are explicitly
forbidden by criminal law.153 Therefore, regardless of which approach
courts take, “categorical” or “game-specific,” the phrase “permits such
gaming” cannot possibly permit what is explicitly prohibited under state
criminal law.154 Accordingly, if a type of Class III gaming is explicitly
“illegal in a state, that type of gaming may not lawfully be included in a
compact pursuant to IGRA.”155
A close reading of cases that considered the Cabazon regulatoryprohibitory distinction in relation to IGRA supports this proposition.156 In
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe and Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians, where the courts permitted tribes to operate certain
Class III games, the courts “determined that the specific gaming activity
proposed by the Indian tribe was in fact permitted by the state[]” and was
149. See, e.g., The Seminole Tribe of Florida’s Motion for Rehearing at 8–9, Fla. House of
Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 2008) (No. SC07-2154).
150. Id. at 2 (footnote omitted).
151. Id. at 8.
152. Id.
153. See 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5) (2006) (“Indian tribes have the exclusive right to regulate
gaming activity on Indian lands if the gaming activity is . . . conducted within a State which does
not, as a matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibit such gaming activity.”).
154. Crist, 999 So. 2d at 615 (noting that “IGRA . . . makes it unlawful for Tribes to operate
particular Class III games that State law completely and affirmatively prohibits.” (quoting 63 Fed.
Reg. 3289, 3293 (Jan. 22, 1998))).
155. Crist Response, supra note 20, at 13; see Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians v.
Wilson, 64 F.3d 1250, 1258 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that “a state need only allow Indian tribes to
operate games that others can operate, but need not give tribes what others cannot have” (footnote
omitted)).
156. See Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22,
1993).
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not expressly prohibited by state law.157 On the other hand, in Rumsey and
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, where the courts prohibited the tribes from
offering certain Class III games, the courts found there were no state laws
that permitted the Class III games at issue.158
As noted above, Florida criminal law affirmatively prohibits “banked”
card games.159 The Tribe does not dispute this; however, it claims that
Florida law contains multiple exceptions to this prohibition and therefore,
“banked” games are not totally repugnant to Florida’s public policy.160
Accordingly, the Tribe argues because Florida allows “banked” games in
other capacities, the State is regulating the games rather than prohibiting
them.161As a result, the Tribe argues the State cannot forbid the operation
of Class III games on tribal lands.162
The Tribe asserts a facially strong argument. Recall that Florida’s
criminal law prohibiting “banked” games is not absolute nor without
exceptions.163 Florida’s exceptions to its general prohibition on “banked”
card games may demonstrate Florida has a broader public policy of
tolerating Class III gaming on Indian lands.164 In expressly prohibiting
specific forms of Class III gaming, however, the Florida Legislature has
demonstrated it is unwilling “to allow all but a few forms of Class III
157. Id. For instance, in Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, a Connecticut statute permitted the
operation of the specific forms of Class III gaming in question. Id.; see supra notes 105–10 and
accompanying text. Likewise, in Lac du Flambeau, the court concluded that Wisconsin did not
prohibit games involving prize, chance, and consideration. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 1993 WL
475999, at *8. Therefore the ruling allowing the tribes to negotiate over certain types of Class III
games “was limited to the specific category of games . . . [not expressly] prohibited by Wisconsin
[law].” Id.
158. See Rumsey, 64 F.3d at 1256 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 330 (West 2009) (stating that
California law expressly prohibited the operation of “banked” card games as well as slot machines
as a misdemeanor offense)); Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273, 277 (8th
Cir. 1993) (noting South Dakota law does not permit traditional keno).
159. See supra Part II.B (discussing Florida’s gaming laws); see also FLA. STAT. § 849.08
(2009) (“Whoever plays or engages in any game at cards, keno, roulette, faro or other game of
chance, at any place, by any device whatever, for money or other thing of value, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor of the second degree . . . .”); Id. § 849.086(12)(a) (“No person . . . may conduct any
banking game or any game not specifically authorized by this section.”); Id. § 849.11 (noting
“[w]hoever sets up, promotes or plays at any game of chance . . . or any other gambling device
whatever for, or for the disposal of money or other thing of value . . . shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor of the second degree . . . .”); Crist, 999 So. 2d at 614 (noting blackjack, baccarat, and
chemin de fer are banked card games and, therefore, are illegal in Florida).
160. The Seminole Tribe of Florida’s Motion for Rehearing at 3, 4, Fla. House of
Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 2008) (No. SC07-2154) (footnote omitted).
161. Id. at 8 (citing N. Arapaho Tribe v. Wyoming, 389 F.3d 1308, 1312 (10th Cir. 2004)).
162. Id.
163. See supra Part II.B (discussing Florida’s gaming laws).
164. See Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22,
1993) (quoting Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d, 1024, 1031 (2d Cir. 1990)
(noting the Class III gaming was “not totally repugnant to” the state’s public policy)).
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activities and those which are allowed are subject to strict regulation.”165
Just because the State permits individual Class III gaming activities does
not mean the State’s public policy permits all Class III activities.166 As a
result, Florida’s overall public policy regarding the prohibition of Class III
gaming is not affected by a few limited exceptions. Therefore, because the
Compact permits the Tribe to operate games that are otherwise illegal
under Florida law, the Compact clearly violates Florida’s public policy,
thereby failing the Supreme Court’s public policy test.
In conclusion, the Compact provisions permitting the Tribe to operate
Class III games completely override Florida criminal law and violate
Florida’s public policy. As a result, the Compact violates IGRA by
authorizing “banked games that are criminally prohibited in Florida.”167 In
other words, because Florida does not “permit such gaming” the Compact
fails to meet one of the requirements of IGRA, thereby violating IGRA and
theoretically rendering the Compact void.168
C. Game Breaker? The Complication of the Secretary’s
Approval of the Compact
Although the Compact violates state law and is theoretically void, the
Secretary approved the Compact and provided notice in the Federal
Register.169 As a general rule, once the Secretary approves a compact and
publishes notice in the Federal Register, it goes into effect.170 The validity
of a compact under state law, however, is a separate and distinct
165. Id. at *10. The Florida penal code prohibits a broad range of gambling activities. Id.
(citing FLA. STAT. § 849.08 (2009)). Certain games, however, which would otherwise be Class III
games, are exempted from this statutory scheme. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 146.
However, these instances are limited and do not affect the overall public policy of the state to
prohibit Class III gaming. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 1993 WL 475999, at *9.
166. Id. at *8.
167. Petitioners’ Reply in Support of a Writ of Quo Warranto at 1, Fla. House of
Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 2008) (No. SC07-2154). A compact that is invalid
under state law is invalid under IGRA. See, e.g., Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 104 F.3d 1546,
1554 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding compact approved by Secretary of the Interior was invalid because
the compact was not properly “entered into” under state law and therefore was not in effect under
the requirements of IGRA); Narragansett Indian Tribe of R.I. v. Rhode Island, No. 94-0618, 1996
WL 97856, at *2 (D.R.I. Feb. 13, 1996) (holding that a compact signed by the governor, who
lacked authority under state law to sign the compact, is void under IGRA and has no legal effect);
Kickapoo Tribe of Indians v. Babbitt, 827 F. Supp. 37, 46 (D.D.C.1993) (holding because the
governor did not have authority to sign the compact, the compact does not comply with IGRA and
is invalid), rev’d, 43 F.3d 1491 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
168. IGRA states a compact is in effect “only to the extent the compact is consistent with
[IGRA].” 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8)(C) (2006).
169. See Crist, 999 So. 2d at 606 (noting “[o]n January 7, 2008, upon publication of the
Secretary’s approval, the Compact went into effect”).
170. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 104 F.3d at 1553 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(B) (2006)).
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requirement from the Secretary’s approval.171 The Secretary cannot, “by
his approval, give life to a compact which was void from its inception.”172
If a compact is invalid under state law, the compact should be rendered
“void, and the subsequent approval of the compact[] and publication of
notice in the Federal Register [does not] give life to the void
compact[].”173
IGRA imposes two individual requirements before Class III gaming is
authorized: “[T]he State and the Tribe must have ‘entered into’ a compact
and the compact must be ‘in effect’ pursuant to Secretarial approval.”174
The “entered into” language under IGRA is a separate requirement.175
Therefore, “the compact must be validly entered into by a state before it
can go into effect, via Secretarial approval, under IGRA.”176
Because the Class III gaming permitted under the Compact between the
State of Florida and the Tribe is unlawful in Florida, the Compact was
never validly “entered into” and was not automatically in effect upon
approval by the Secretary.177 The notice in the Federal Register “does not
authorize illegal gaming and will not buttress a void compact.”178
Therefore, because the Florida Supreme Court determined the Compact
violated state law, “the [invalid C]ompact is not entered into and the
publication does not authorize Class III gaming.”179 Despite the apparent
invalidity of the Compact, however, the Tribe continues to operate Class III
games in several of its casinos throughout Florida.180
IV. WHAT’S IN THE CARDS FOR INDIAN GAMING IN FLORIDA?
A. All Bets Are Off: No Resolution in Sight
Even though the Compact is in direct violation of state law, and thus,
invalid under IGRA, Seminole casinos throughout Florida continue to
operate illegal Class III games.181 In the meantime, the State and other
interested third-parties have grappled with how to stop the Tribe from
171. Id. at 1554 (citations omitted).
172. Id. at 1548.
173. Id. at 1553.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1555.
176. Id. (footnote omitted).
177. John Holland, Odds Favor Seminoles, Despite Compact Ruling, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL,
Sept. 16, 2008, at B1, available at 2008 WLNR 17572989.
178. Id.
179. Letter from McCollum, supra note 19.
180. Id.; see also Fla. House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 608 (Fla. 2008)
(noting that the Tribe “has begun offering blackjack and other games at the Seminole Hard Rock
Hotel and Casino”).
181. Letter from McCollum, supra note 19.
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operating the illegal games.182 In the wake of the court’s decision in
Florida House of Representatives v. Crist, several attempts were made to
halt the illegal gambling, all of which proved unsuccessful.183 Specifically,
the State of Florida was unable to stop the illegal Class III gambling
because it possesses no compulsory authority over the activities on Indian
lands.184 As Florida Attorney General Bill McCollum noted: “Florida [is]
in the untenable position of having a tribal gaming operation, which
everyone acknowledges is unauthorized, ongoing without the jurisdiction
to stop the illegal gaming activities.”185 Additionally, the Tribe’s sovereign
immunity, together with the compulsory joinder rule,186 prevented
interested third-parties from halting the Tribe’s operation of the illegal
games.187 For example, the Pompano Harness Racing Track in Pompano
Beach, Florida (PPI), a competing pari-mutuel facility,188 sought a
judgment setting aside the Department’s action approving the Compact, a
judgment declaring the Compact invalid under IGRA, and a permanent
injunction enjoining implementation of the Compact provisions.189 The
Tribe’s sovereign immunity prevented PPI from joining the Seminole Tribe
to the action.190 The district judge denied PPI’s motion, finding that the
Tribe is an indispensible party to the action and must be joined to the suit
182. See Holland, supra note 177 (“The situation is very uncertain because there’s no obvious
road map on what happens next. . . . [Although] everyone admits there’s no valid
compact[,] . . . there’s no blueprint on how to unwind the clock and get back to where we were
before the governor reached the agreement.” (quoting attorney Carlos Muniz, who worked on
House Speaker Marco Rubio’s successful Supreme Court challenge)).
183. See infra notes 181–87 and accompanying text.
184. “The State has no regulatory jurisdiction over conduct occurring on Indian lands,” and
“gaming on sovereign Indian lands is governed exclusively by federal law.” Crist Response, supra
note 20, at 33; see Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 493 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting “[a]s
sovereigns, Indian tribes are subordinate only to the federal government.” (citing California v.
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987))); PPI, Inc. v. Kempthorne, No.
4:08CV248(SPM), 2008 WL 2705431, at *2 (N.D. Fla. July 8, 2008) (noting “[u]nless otherwise
agreed in an approved compact, prosecution of state gambling laws remains within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the federal government”).
185. See Letter from McCollum, supra note 19.
186. Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires joinder of a party when a court
determines the party is necessary to the action. FED. R. CIV. P. 19.
187. See PPI, Inc., 2008 WL 2705431, at *3–4.
188. PPI is authorized by the state of Florida “to offer pari-mutuel wagering, poker, and slot
machines at its . . . facility [but] is prohibited by Florida law to operate any other type of gaming
activities.” Id. at *1.
189. Id. PPI contended it would suffer “irreparable injury through the loss of competitive
standing, customer good will, and revenue, because its customers will be diverted to the banked
card games that are offered by the Seminole Tribe.” Id.
190. Id. at *3. “It is well-established that Indian tribes have immunity from suit in federal,
state, and tribal courts.” Fletcher, supra note 1, at 12 (citing Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs.,
Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 753–54 (1998)).
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under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because it has a
significant interest in the outcome of the litigation.191 The court
acknowledged that “[a]lthough there is no alternative forum for PPI to
litigate its claim, in equity and good conscience this case cannot proceed
without the Seminole Tribe.”192
To make matters worse, the only authority with the power to stop the
illegal gaming activities—the federal authorities—decided not to intervene,
giving the State and the Tribe “the opportunity to work out their
differences.”193 Finally, however, after nearly a year following the Florida
Supreme Court’s decision in Florida House of Representatives v. Crist, the
Florida Legislature presented the Tribe with the Proposed Compact, in
hopes of bringing closure to Florida’s gaming crisis.
B. The Final Stretch: The State’s Proposed Solution to Florida’s
Gaming Crisis and the Tribe’s Response
Approximately a year and a half after the execution of the original
Compact, the Florida Legislature passed the Proposed Compact that
effectively set the parameters for a new compact between the State and the
Tribe.194 Although the Proposed Compact authorized the governor to
negotiate a new compact with the Tribe for the purpose of operating Class
III games, the Proposed Compact specified the requirements and minimum
standards for the compact and required legislative ratification.195 Notably,
the Proposed Compact’s terms were not as favorable to the Tribe as the
terms of the original Compact. For example, the Proposed Compact
increased the annual payments the Tribe must make to the State; yet it
decreased the number of casinos at which the Tribe is permitted to operate
Class III games.196 Specifically, under the guidelines of the Proposed
Compact, the State would give the Tribe the exclusive right to offer
blackjack and other banked games at its existing four casinos located in
Broward and Hillsborough Counties.197 In return, the Tribe would be
expected to make an initial payment to the State of $600 million.198 The
Tribe would then pay the State at least $150 million per year over the next
191. PPI, Inc., 2008 WL 2705431, at *3 (noting “the Seminole Tribe is a necessary party to
this action because it has an interest in the [C]ompact and it is conducting gaming activities that PPI
seeks to invalidate”).
192. Id. at *4.
193. See Wozniak, supra note 18.
194. See Gaming Act, supra note 22.
195. See generally id. § 2, at 20–25.
196. Id. at 19, 37–38.
197. Id. at 25.
198. Memorandum from Charlie Christ, Governor of Florida, to Interested Media Regarding
the Seminole Compact Accords (Apr. 22, 2009), available at http://www.flgov.com/release/10681
[hereinafter Crist Memorandum].
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fifteen years.199 In contrast, the original Compact allowed the Tribe to
operate Class III games at all seven of the Tribe’s casinos, and required an
initial payment of $375 million over the first three years and a minimum
payment of $100 million over a span of twenty-five years.200
A little more than two months following the passage of the Proposed
Compact, tribal leaders and the governor signed a new version of the
Proposed Compact.201 Notably, the Tribe rejected several key provisions
contained in the Proposed Compact and set forth new terms to govern their
Class III gaming operations.202 Among other things, the new terms to the
Proposed Compact allow the Tribe to offer Class III games at all seven of
its Florida casinos.203 It also provides the Tribe with near exclusive Class
III gaming rights outside of Miami-Dade and Broward Counties.204 Similar
to the Proposed Compact, the Tribe’s revisions still provide the state with a
minimum annual payment of $150 million.205 In order for the revisions of
the Proposed Compact to take effect, however, the Florida Legislature
must ratify it.206 Currently, many lawmakers are reluctant to support the
proposal because the terms depart from key provisions lawmakers set forth
in the Proposed Compact.207 Moreover, there has been a large outcry from
Florida’s pari-mutuel industry, who fear the Tribe’s Class III gaming rights
will undercut the competition in Florida’s gaming industry.208 Opposition
has also mounted from lawmakers in both parties who morally oppose
gambling and who are reluctant to expand gambling in Florida.209 As a
result of the various complex issues and varied interests involved, the
future of Florida’s tribal gaming industry is highly uncertain.210

199. Gaming Act, supra note 22, § 2, at 37–38, 51.
200. Crist Memorandum, supra note 198; Crist, 999 So. 2d at 641–43; see also supra notes
13–15 and accompanying text.
201. See Crist Press Release, supra note 25. For a copy of the revised Compact, see Crist Press
Release at Attachments, available at http://www.flgov.com/pdfs/20090831 [hereinafter Revised
Compact].
202. Dolinski, supra note 26; Jeremy Wallace, Gaming Deal in Jeopardy, SARASOTA HERALD
TRIB., Sept. 19, 2009, at B, available at 2009 WLNR 18638693.
203. Dolinski, supra note 26; see Revised Compact, supra note 201, at Part IV.B.
204. Dolinski, supra note 26; see Revised Compact, supra note 201, at Part XII.
205. Dolinski, supra note 26; see Revised Compact, supra note 201, at Part XI.
206. Dolinski, supra note 26.
207. Id.
208. Jon Hafenbrack, Senator: Gambling Deal not Sure Thing, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 11,
2009, at B1, available at 2009 WLNR 17928870.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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C. Is the Tribe Outplayed? Tribal Considerations Regarding the
Proposed Compact
The tensions between the Tribe and the State in the compact
negotiations mainly center on the revenue-sharing provisions in the
Proposed Compact211—that is, the payments the Tribe commits to pay the
State in exchange for the exclusive right to operate Class III games.212
Revenue-sharing provisions have been touted as “the most controversial
part of state tribal-gaming compacts.”213 Negotiating these provisions
requires both parties to undergo a series of fact-intensive inquiries and
strategic decisions that have both short-term and long-term implications.214
Given the political and legal backdrop of tribal-state negotiations in the
wake of two significant federal court cases, Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida and Texas v. United States, the State may be endowed with
significant political leverage over the Tribe that potentially leaves the Tribe
with no recourse to require the State to negotiate the terms of a compact.
As a result, the Tribe must consider how firm it wishes to be with its
current demands and may need to tread carefully with any future demands
it chooses to place on the State. Ultimately, both the State and the Tribe
stand to benefit from a successfully negotiated compact. The challenge,
however, is to ensure any compact between the Tribe and the State imposes
reasonable regulation on the Tribe and provides a steady flow of income to
the State. Additionally, state lawmakers must balance the interests of
Florida’s gaming industry with the concerns of those who are reluctant to
expand gambling in Florida.
1. Revenue-Sharing Provisions in the Context of Tribal-State
Compacts
Revenue-sharing of tribal gaming takes place through “exclusivity
provisions that allow the State to reap the benefits of the lucrative gaming
industry.”215 Essentially, these provisions provide tribes “the substantially
exclusive right to operate Class III gaming, provided that they contribute a
211. Dolinksi, supra note 26 (noting “[t]he terms may require some ‘modification’—
specifically with regard to exclusive gaming rights for the [T]ribe”); Wozniak, supra note 18
(noting the Bill only provides the Tribe with partial exclusivity, “so the $150 million per year may
not be justified”).
212. See Steven Andrew Light, Kathryn R.L. Rand & Alan P. Meister, Spreading the Wealth:
Indian Gaming and Revenue-Sharing Agreements, 80 N.D. L. REV. 657, 665 (2004).
213. Eidson, supra note 43, at 325.
214. Light, Rand & Meister, supra note 212, at 659. Accordingly, this Note does not attempt
to suggest the specific details of a revenue-sharing provision between the State of Florida and the
Tribe. It does, however, set forth important considerations both the Tribe and the State must make
when negotiating these provisions.
215. Eidson, supra note 43, at 320.
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certain portion of their revenues to the state.”216 Notably, “the legal limits
of revenue sharing are very much a grey area of the law.”217 Generally, a
state is permitted to take payments from a tribe in exchange for providing
the tribe with a “valuable economic benefit” or “substantial exclusivity” in
the market.218 Unfortunately, Congress has failed to clarify what
constitutes “substantial exclusivity.”219 The Secretary, however, has noted
that the benefit the state receives must be “appropriate in light of [the]
benefit conferred on the tribe.”220 A payment that exceeds the benefit a
tribe receives violates a provision in IGRA that prohibits states from
imposing any tax or fees on tribal casinos for executing a compact.221
Revenue-sharing arrangements take a number of forms222 with the
payments the tribes make to the states and the exclusivity the states provide
in return varying drastically from state to state.223 Connecticut, for
example, provides tribes with a high degree of exclusivity in exchange for
a substantial payment from the tribe.224 Specifically, Connecticut has
completely prohibited casino gambling within the state in exchange for
25% of the net gaming revenue generated by the Foxwoods Resort and the
Mohegan Sun Resort.225 While the tribes pay the state a large percentage,
the tribes benefit “from a relatively high level of exclusivity” because
Connecticut law otherwise prohibits the operation of Class III games and
216. Eidson, supra note 43, at 321.
217. Light & Rand, supra note 1, at 435.
218. Light & Rand, supra note 1, at 435.
219. Light & Rand, supra note 1, at 434–35.
220. Eidson, supra note 43, at 326 (quoting Oversight Hearing on Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act; Role and Funding of the National Indian Gaming Commission Before the S. Comm. on Indian
Affairs, 108th Cong. 3 (2003) (statement of Aurene M. Martin, Acting Assistant Secretary, Indian
Affairs, Department of the Interior)).
221. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(4) (2006) (noting a state shall not “impose any tax, fee, charge, or
other assessment upon an Indian tribe . . . to engage in a [C]lass III activity”); see Press Release,
Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior, U.S. Department of the Interior, Statement of Secretary of
the Interior Bruce Babbitt on the New Mexico Gaming Compacts (Aug. 23, 1997), available at
http://www.scienceblog.com/community/older/archives/N/int0938.shtml [hereinafter Babbit Press
Release] (noting “[t]he Department has sharply limited the circumstances under which Indian tribes
can make direct payments to a State” in order to prevent states from “leverag[ing] very large
payments from the Tribes, in derogation of Congress’ intent” in IGRA).
222. Light, Rand & Meister, supra note 212, at 667 (noting revenue-sharing agreements “take
a number of forms, including percentage payments, fixed compact payments, impact/mitigation fees
and taxes, contributions to community funds, and redistribution to non-gaming tribes”).
223. Id. at 667–68. Depending on the type of agreement and the amount of gaming revenue
tribes realize, annual payments to the state vary dramatically from state to state. Id. In 2003 for
example, Connecticut tribes paid the state about $400 million, while Arizona tribes and Michigan
tribes paid roughly $43 million and $32 million respectively. Id. at 668–69.
224. Id. at 665.
225. Fletcher, supra note 38, at 436. Foxwoods Resort is owned by the Mashantucket Pequots,
and the Mohegan Sun Resort is owned by the Mohegan Tribe of Connecticut. Id.
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slot machines by commercial gaming interests.226 In contrast, “other states
have offered less than total or absolute exclusivity over casino-style
gaming in exchange for revenue sharing.”227 In Michigan, for example,
where it is impossible for the state to provide absolute exclusivity because
“tribal casinos may have saturated the market,” the tribes give the state a
smaller percentage of their tribal-gaming revenue.228 One Michigan tribe
negotiated an amendment to an existing compact where the tribe and the
state agreed the “ability to open satellite gaming facilities constitutes
enough of a valuable economic benefit to promise revenue sharing
payments of 6% of net gaming revenue” at the tribe’s casino.229
In the absence of a clear definition of what constitutes “substantial
exclusivity,” tribes and states are left to determine for themselves how
much exclusivity is appropriate in exchange for revenue sharing.230 Such
decisions “are strategic decisions made within a broad and complex
context by both tribal and state actors that have both short-term and longterm economic and public policy impacts.”231 Accordingly, before a final
agreement is reached, the Tribe and the State must analyze the Proposed
Compact’s revenue-sharing provisions in the context of the current
economic and political situation in the State.232 In determining whether the
Proposed Compact’s revenue-sharing provisions are appropriate, the
parties must consider difficult questions. For example: Are the Tribe’s
payments appropriate in light of the exclusivity conferred on the Tribe? Is
absolute exclusivity feasible or is partial exclusivity more realistic? If the
State agrees to provide the Tribe with more exclusivity, should the State
demand larger payments from the Tribe? How do the interests of Florida’s
gaming industry and the concerns of those who morally oppose gambling
factor into the decision? How much is either party willing to concede in
return for a successfully negotiated compact? If the parties do not agree to
a compact, what are the alternatives?
226. Light, Rand & Meister, supra note 212, at 676.
227. Id. (footnote omitted). The Secretary’s “position on revenue sharing appears to allow a
state to offer a tribe less than total exclusivity, but just how much less is not clear.” Id. at 676–77
(footnote omitted).
228. Fletcher, supra note 38, at 437 (noting “Michigan tribal casinos may have saturated the
market to the point that the prospect of giving the state anywhere from 8% to 20% of tribal gaming
revenue is unreasonable, and more importantly, unprofitable”).
229. Id. Note, the Department did not accept or disapprove of the amendment to the compact
because it was concerned that the state did not make any meaningful concessions in exchange for a
percentage of the gaming revenge. Id. at 438.
230. See Eidson, supra note 43, at 338 (citing Indian Gaming Regulatory Act Amendments:
Hearing on S. 1529, Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 108th Cong. 33–36 (2004) (statement
of George Skibine, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy and Economic Development,
Department of the Interior)).
231. Light, Rand & Meister, supra note 212, at 659 (footnote omitted).
232. See id. at 676.
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While both parties must grapple with these difficult decisions, the
Tribe, in particular, must also consider another important factor—the
Tribe’s bargaining position in light of two significant federal court
decisions: Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida and Texas v. United States.
As this Note suggests, in light of these two decisions, the Tribe and the
State may not be sitting at a level bargaining table.
2. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida and Texas v. United States
and their Impact on Tribal-State Negotiations
As noted above, the U.S. Supreme Court, in its landmark decision in
Seminole Tribe, held that under the Eleventh Amendment, Indian tribes do
not have the right to bring suit against a state for failure to comply with the
good faith negotiation provision of IGRA.233 The Court’s ruling has
resulted in what some have termed the “Seminole problem.”234 In essence,
the ruling permits states to simply refuse to negotiate a tribal-state
compact, thereby preventing a tribe from engaging in Class III gaming
altogether.235 The ruling effectively shifted the political balance in favor of
the states and left tribes with virtually no negotiating power.236 In other
words, Seminole Tribe permits a state, if it chooses, to use its “political
clout” and refuse to negotiate with the tribe, effectively preventing a tribe
from operating Class III games.237
Historically, however, tribes have used the Secretarial Procedures as a
“trump card” to the Seminole Tribe decision. In the event a state asserts its
sovereign immunity and refuses to negotiate with a tribe, the tribe can
petition the Secretary for a framework to regulate Class III gaming
activities.238 That is, if a state fails to negotiate with a tribe, a tribe can
circumvent the state by seeking the Secretary’s approval of its Class III
gaming proposal.239 In the past, tribes have used the Secretarial Procedures
as leverage to entice states to negotiate because if the tribe bypassed the
233. See Eidson, supra note 43, at 325; supra Part II.A.
234. Statement of Billie, supra note 56, at 55 (noting the Tribe “seeks to solve the ‘Seminole
problem’ as it is known (although [the Tribe] see[s] it as the ‘State of Florida problem.’”)).
235. Eidson, supra note 43, at 325; Fletcher, supra note 38, at 432; Light & Rand, supra note
1, at 431; Light, Rand & Meister, supra note 212, at 664–65.
236. See Rand & Light, supra note 8, at 414–15 (noting the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida “upset IGRA’s careful but tenuous balance of tribal and state
authority[]” and “[i]n effect, the Court’s decision gave states greater authority over tribes than did
Congress through IGRA, as a state could not be sued in federal court by a tribe without the state’s
consent”) (footnote omitted); see also Fletcher, supra note 38, at 432; Light & Rand, supra note 1,
at 431; Light, Rand & Meister, supra note 212, at 664–65; Rand & Light, supra note 8, at 446.
237. Fletcher, supra note 38, at 432; Light & Rand, supra note 1, at 431; Light, Rand &
Meister, supra note 212, at 664–65; Rand & Light, supra note 8, at 446, 463.
238. See supra Part II.A.
239. See Light & Rand, supra note 1, at 432.
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state, the state could potentially lose billions of dollars in gaming
revenue.240 In light of the recent ruling in Texas v. United States, however,
the traditional trump card may not give tribes the upper hand like it has in
the past.241
In Texas v. United States, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held the
Secretarial Procedures are “invalid and constitute an unreasonable
interpretation of IGRA.”242 Accordingly, the court held the Secretary does
not have the authority to promulgate Secretarial Procedures for a tribe’s
operation of Class III gaming.243 The court reasoned “the Secretarial
Procedures stand in direct violation” of IGRA’s “unambiguous language”
and Congress’ intent by “bypassing the neutral judicial process that
centrally protects the state’s role in authorizing tribal Class III gaming.”244
Interestingly, the court recognized the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Seminole Tribe “produced the unexpected result that a state may ‘veto’
Class III gaming by exercising its Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity.”245 The court noted, however, that the “outcome has no bearing
on the scope of the administrative authority originally delegated by
Congress to the Secretary.”246
Following the Fifth Circuit’s ruling striking down the Secretary’s
regulations, the State of Texas refused to negotiate a compact with the
tribe, and as a result, Class III tribal gaming does not exist in Texas
today.247 Unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court denied a petition for
certiorari,248 and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has yet to rule on
the validity of the Secretarial Procedures.249 As a result, the Secretarial
Procedures might still be available to the Tribe as no binding court has yet
to rule on the issue.
Regardless, in the wake of Seminole Tribe and Texas v. United States,
the Tribe still must consider its weakened bargaining position. By altering
240. Seminole attorneys have already threatened the State that it will seek the Secretary’s
approval if a compact cannot be negotiated. Wozniak, supra note 18. “If we cannot successfully
achieve a compact, then we will seek federal authorization directly to engage in (Class III) gaming;”
tribal attorney, Barry Richard, said. Id. “Either we’ll have a new compact with the state or
procedures issued by the federal government,” Richard said. Id.
241. See Light & Rand, supra note 1, at 432 (noting the Secretary’s regulations “have not been
of much use to tribes stonewalled by states unwilling to negotiate gaming compacts”).
242. Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 511 (5th Cir. 2007).
243. Id. at 503, 509.
244. Id. at 509, 511.
245. Id. at 504.
246. Id.
247. Light & Rand, supra note 1, at 432.
248. Fletcher, supra note 38, at 433–34.
249. The Southern District of Alabama recently dismissed Alabama’s challenge to the
Secretarial Procedures on grounds the action was not ripe for review. See Alabama v. United States,
No. 08-0182-WS-C, 2008 WL 5071904, at *1, 8 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 24, 2008).
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key parameters in the Proposed Compact, the Tribe is at risk that the
Legislature will reject the new proposal. In light of these two decisions, it
is certainly possible that the Tribe will have no recourse to require the State
to negotiate a compact. With full understanding of the imbalance in tribalstate relations in light of these two cases, coupled with the apparent
resistance among lawmakers to further negotiate the terms of the Proposed
Compact,250 the Tribe must consider how firm it wishes to be with its
current demands and tread carefully in any further demands it chooses to
make on the State. Nevertheless, if the Tribe chooses to maintain its
current demands, it should use any leverage available to it in order to gain
concessions from the State. Indeed, in light of the current economic
downturn, the revenue the Tribe pays the State is the single most important
card the Tribe holds in its hands during its negotiations with the State.
Accordingly, the Tribe must use this leverage to “take advantage of the
ever-growing state and local governmental reliance” on the Tribe’s
funds.251
All things considered, both the State and the Tribe benefit from
agreeing to a compact that contains a delicate balance between the Tribe’s
interests in operating Class III games and lawmakers’ desire to limit
gambling in Florida. From the State’s perspective, tribal-gaming revenue
will help stimulate Florida’s economy by infusing billions of dollars into
Florida’s public education system, creating additional job opportunities at a
time of dire need, and alleviating Florida’s huge budget deficit.252 By the
same token, the Tribe will also gain significantly from reaching an
250. Bill Opens Way for Crist, Seminoles to Talk Gaming Compact, Associated Press, May 8,
2009, available at http://www2.tbo.com/content/2009/may/08/081921/bill-opens-way-cristseminoles-talk-gaming-compact/news-politics/. Senate President Jeff Atwater said, “the tribe
probably won’t get much better than what the proposal offers.” Id. “This is a deal that they should
take seriously and quickly negotiate and bring closure to,” Atwater said. Id. Furthermore,
Representative Bill Galvano, who led the Florida House of Representative negotiations, recently
stated that “the exclusivity provision is not up for negotiation.” Dolinski, supra note 26.
251. See Fletcher, supra note 38, at 425. “For states and localities plagued by budgetary
shortfalls, tribal gaming increasingly is perceived as a means to recoup losses or even to grow
regional economies.” Light, Rand & Meister, supra note 212, at 679. Florida, in particular, is
experiencing record unemployment rates and has a multi-billion-dollar deficit. See Crist
Memorandum, supra note 198. Accordingly, the State is relying upon gaming revenue to help
balance budgets, fund programs and pay for Florida’s education. Id.
252. Pursuant to the terms of the Bill, the Tribe would make an upfront payment of $600
million to the State, which would go directly toward alleviating the State’s multi-billion-dollar
deficit. See Crist Memorandum, supra note 198. The Bill is also estimated to generate 45,000 new
jobs “at a time of record unemployment in the state” while simultaneously “protect[ing] the jobs of
thousands of Floridians currently employed by the gaming industry.” Id. Perhaps Florida’s public
schools, which have taken a big hit during the economic downturn, stand to gain the most from the
new Bill, as the amount of money going toward educational funding is “equivalent to paying the
salaries of more than 12,000 Florida school teachers.” Id.
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agreement with the State. Through the operation of Class III games, the
Seminole casinos will raise billions of dollars in tribal revenue that will
enable the Tribe to improve its quality of life by building homes and
schools and creating infrastructure, among other things.253
While both the Tribe and the State assert facially divergent interests—
that is, on the one hand, the Tribe’s interest to operate Class III gaming,
and, on the other hand, the State’s desire to limit gambling in Florida—
these two positions are not entirely irreconcilable. To begin with, it seems
the worst-case scenario for both parties is failure to reach an agreement at
all. For the Seminoles, that would be one step closer to the federal
government closing down its Class III gaming facilities.254 For the State,
that could mean the Secretary stepping in to issue Class III gaming
procedures.255 Indeed, if the parties cannot reach an agreement, either of
these scenarios is probable. In the absence of a valid Class III gaming
compact, it is only a matter of time before the federal government steps in
and forces the Tribe to halt the illegal gaming activities. By comparison,
pursuant to the Secretarial Procedures currently in effect in the Eleventh
Circuit, the Secretary could presumably bypass the State and issue a
compact which allows the Tribe to operate Class III games. Either of these
outcomes results in the loss of billions of dollars to the parties. This is
hardly the outcome the Tribe or the State desires. Furthermore, failing to
reach an agreement prolongs this nearly two-decade-long battle between
the Tribe and the State. Clearly, both parties have a shared interest in
resolving this issue amicably and efficiently as future negotiation and
potential mediation and litigation may prove costly to both parties. Finally,
if the parties fail to reach an agreement, it may be years before a resolution
is reached. Even then, neither party can be sure of the outcome.
V. CONCLUSION
This Note has taken an in-depth look at the controversy surrounding the
nearly two-decade-long clash between the Seminole Tribe and the State of
Florida over the operation of Class III games within the State.
253. See Statement of Billie, supra note 56. “Class III gaming pursuant to a tribal-state
compact . . . would allow the Tribe the economic stability to make long-term economic decisions
for the benefit of the Tribe and its members.” Id. A Class III gaming compact would enable the
Tribe to “expand[] rehabilitation services and on-reservation treatment for chronically ill tribal
members, improve[] surface-water control systems, [and roads], expand[] cultural programs and
increase[] investment in non-gaming economic development activities.”Id. Inevitably, tribal-gaming
will allow “the Tribe to meet its own needs, rather than relying on handouts from the federal
government.”Id.
254. Babbitt Press Release, supra note 221 (noting if a tribe does not agree to a compact,
“existing gaming establishments may be threatened with closure”); see supra Part I (explaining the
benefit tribal gaming has on both Indian and non-Indian communities).
255. See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text.
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Understanding that compact agreements are strategic decisions that have
economic and public-policy impacts, this Note does not seek to encourage
the Tribe or the State to take any particular action with regard to a Class III
gaming compact. This Note merely encourages both parties to seek a
mutually-beneficial resolution. All things considered, both the State and
the Tribe stand to gain from reaching an agreement. In the wake of
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida and Texas v. United States, however,
this Note cautions the Tribe to tread carefully in any negotiations with the
State, as there is a possibility it will have no recourse to require the State to
negotiate compact terms.
Clearly, the challenge here is for both parties to be creative in
formulating options and to tailor an agreement that contains enough
exclusivity to satisfy IGRA but assures the State appropriate compensation.
Accordingly, the parties must strike a delicate balance among the Tribe’s
interests in operating Class III games, lawmakers’ desire to limit gambling
in Florida, and third-party interests to maintain competition in Florida’s
gaming industry. The key is ensuring the compact imposes a reasonable
regulation on the Tribe and provides a steady flow of income to the State.
In the interest of all parties involved—the Governor of Florida, the Florida
Legislature, Seminole Tribe officials, Florida’s gaming industry, and the
citizens of the State of Florida—the State and the Tribe must work together
to secure a viable solution to this problem before an unfavorable solution is
imposed on them.
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